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Abstract
The thesis of panpsychism is that throughout the natural universe there is
mentality, althouJh I prefer the term "mind". We human beings experience this
mentality in everyday consciousness and by analogy we are able to assert that

mentality is not confined to the human experience alone. The extent to which this
mentality penetrates, or is imbued by, our natural world has been a subject for
discussion in western schools of philosophy since the ancient Greeks and in the
even more ancient eastern schools of theosophy, such as Buddhism and the
Hinduism of the Upanishads. I use the tenn "theosophy" here to bring a sense of
esoteric speculation to the panpsychism debate (OxfOrd English Die/ ionary). A
recent resurgence of interest in panpsychism has recognised the inadequacy of the
materialist persp~ctive, and attempts have been made to resolve the main
stumbling block, the

mind-body/mind-matt~r

problem, and to provide a realistic

and adequate account of panpsychism. But, it is generally accepted by most of
those interested in the debate and whose works I review, that so far this has not
succeeded. Therefore, a new and more radical approach is required.
It is the intention of my thesis to demonstrate that only when we break free
from our dualistic perspective, a perspective reflective of our thinking mind, our
language, and our cultural/social constructs, can we intuitively understand the true
nature of the mind-body relationship. I will argue that the truth of this intuitive
understanding becomes apparent when we experience what I have tenned
"personal

panpsychic

experiences,"

and

that

these

experiences

are

epistemologically valid. These experiences give rise tv knowledge Jf reality that I
have called the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective. The "dual-aspect
singularity" perspective acknowledges the dual nature of reality but asserts that
any duality as such is merely aspectivism. As such everything that exists has both
a mental and material aspect, neither of which is ontologieally real, as together
they fonn a singularity. I will argue that the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective
resolves the mind-body mind-brain paradox.
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Preface
The panpsychic thesis is an intuitive proposition. It has found its expression
in poetry, art, and spirituality, as well as in philosophy. As such I hope to be able

to demonstrate that it is not possible to argue the case for panpsychism to a
satisfactory conclusion without recourse to an intuitive perspective. It was

personal experience that has led me to consider this question well before I came to
understand the definition of the term "panpsychism." It is the intention of this
thesis to argue for a position that draws on intuitive knowledge gained from the
"personal panpsychic experience." To demonstrate the kind of experience I am

talking about, let me recount the following story:
I was standing in about twenty.:five centimetres of water when
something bit me on the ankle. As I jerked my foot up and out of the
swf a sea snake moved quickly away, headed out to sea. Two tiny
Apots qf blood were all the evidence /needed to conl'ince myselfthat I
had indeed been bitten. I had been travelling in South East Asia and
Australia long enough to know that when you get bitten by a sea
snake you die. and the length (?f titRe before you die was always
discussed in terms of second,·. not hours or minutes, but seconds. For
some reason I decided at that momcmt that I had seven .\·econdr left.
You cannot imagine, unless you have been in a similar situation, the
rush l?{ thought and .feeling that pulsated through me, as my heart
exploded in my chest and.fi.!elings of dread and anger overwhelmed
my entire being. But then, as I reached the inevitable conclusion that
there was no way out qfthis. after exhm~sling eve1y possible option in
mere flashes qf a second, acceptance took over and calmness came to
me. flllrned to look back fOr the last time at the beach and the land
beyond the dunes. Jlet myse(fgo and the landscape dissolved.
This was not Uf!fmni/iar territory; I had been there before and have
been there since that even!ful day in /97.J. When onlyfour years old I
WCIS playing with friends in "Jield near the village where /lived on
the East Coast q{England. We were running qfter a tractor that was
making its way down a furrowed track alongside ajfeshly rolled field.
The driwr was unaware that he was being chased by a bunch of kids,
He was lowing Cl heuvy rib roller. On the hack of the roller was a
steel mud scapper be~r. It ran the length qfthe roller just wide enough
fbr the fiJo/ of a small child. Iran and managed to step up onto the
bw·. I was only there for u moment befiJre /tumbled down between the
tractor and the roller. My body, luckily, landed in the furrow and was
saved .fi·om the wail of the roller, but my head was not so lucky. It
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came to rest more on the centre of the track and the rollers did a nice
job r?f'opening up the side of my skuf!.
After being carried by the tractor driver to a nearby farmhouse, my
mother r.:ame and I travelled in her arms. in a taxi, to Ipswich Town
Hm.pilal. What is remarkable is 1/wt, although no longer conscious, I
was completely aware of the whole journey. My consciousness was
outside my body observing the rush across the field to the farmhouse,
being laid out on a settee in the parlour, my mother's arrival and the
.final taxi joumey to hospital. I was not four years old and I was not
/he 'me' I had thought I was. I wm· detached, impassive, and in some
sense indifferent. This experience has remained wilh me all my l[fe.
My mother has complained about my indifference to pain since the
accidenl. An indifference that nearly took my l[fe again when I was
len years old, when my appendix burst qfter I had ignored the
stomach pains for several days, much /o /he amazement of the
Doctors. So, here I was again, standing on Cl lonely beach on the East
Coast of Fraser l\·land, far from help and certain of death, detached
and smiling.
I was smiling, no/ jus/ another smile, or an ordinllly smile one shows
to friend\' or loved ones, but a smile of complete and utler
contentment and joy. The beach, the water, the land, all disappeared;
dissolved back into the original mind. And in that mind was
absolutely everything that ever was, thai ever is, and that ever will be.
Every possible musical note, every possible melody. every possible
thing, hung su~pended wilhin its own potential to become. There was
no '/'. There was no 'me', and no 'il' or 'that'. There was nothing, yet
within thai nothing there was somNhirtg. and together they made
everything. And I knew, and have known ever since that day: that,
there is only 'one thing' happening here.
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Introduction
The panpsychism thesis has always been a difficul~ if not slightly taboo
subject for philosophers to discuss, let alone promote in some way, especially
since the Enlightenment. It is difficult to overstate the impact that the

Enlightenment philosophy of reason has had on intellectual life in the West. Out
of the tum10il of the 161h and 1i 11 centuries, a period some consider to be the birth
of modem civilisation, we have witnessed, according to Martin Heidegger (Krell,
1977, pp.243-282), a complete reversal in the way we see ourselves in our

relationship with our environment. He notes that, at this time, the very meaning of
the tenns "subject" and "object" underwent a reversal. Prior to the Renaissance, it
was the surrounding world that had been subject, as supporting one's identity,
one's sense of self: " ... the word object denoted what one cast before himself in
mere fantasy ... " (Krell, 1977, p.280). This changed worldview, reinforced by
Rene Descartes' arguments that split mind and body, was not simply a minor
adjustment in Western intellectual thought. It has been argued that it ''was
symptomatic of a sweeping change in consciousness, in human being itself'
(Rosen, 1994, p.116). Many philosophers, language theorists, writers, and art
historians have noted the profound. change that occurred during that time. I
mention this because it is historically significant to the history of the mind/body
mind/matter problem. This is where Humpty-Dumpty fell off the wall so to speak,
for no one has managed to put mind and body back together again in such a way
that resolves this paradoxical problem.
Paradoxes are important because they point out logical contradictions in our
assumptions. But, why bother with the mind/body paradox when discussing
panpsychism? Because the mind/body problem holds the key to understanding the
panpsychism thesis. There is no point, and no way possible in my view, to try to
resolve the issue of mind in matter as a metaphysical theory in general, whilst
attempting to ignore the mind/body problem, sometimes referred to as the "hard"
problem (Chalmers, 1996, pp.xi-xiii). Ever since Rene Descartes's dictum "I think
therefore I am," probably the most famous in the history of philosophy,
philosophers have struggled to reconcile the mind/body split.
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My argument for a "dual-aspect singularity" is an attempt to introduce an
intuitive element into the debate. It is an attempt to redefine the way we see our
world, and it is an attempt to re-evaluate our relationship with it. According to
Heidegger, the dynamic unity of experience existing prior to the Renaissance was
not utterly obliterated but regulated to oblivion, forgotten, or repressed. This act of
forgetting divided self from other and mind from body, we were left to wonder
how such "fundamentally different" entities could interact (Rosen, 1994, p.\17).
"Is it not obvious," Rosen asks rhetorically, "that as long as we continue to
operate within the Renaissance framework of forgetfulness, the mind-matter
problem cannot authentically be solved, since operating within that framework is
precisely what is responsible for the problem?" (Rosen, 1994, p.I17).
My thesis, and the arguments for it, are attempts to understand the mindmatter problem from a new perspective. It is a perspective that embraces "being"
rather than "thinking". I have not tackled this problem because I think I know the
answer necessarily, but because I believe a significant area of inquiry has not yet
been fully explored. I believe my "dual-aspect singularity" perspective and the
justification for it, which I will explore in this thesis, will help open up that new
approach to the problem. In the light of the latest discoveries in quantum physics,
new research into the human brain activity, and a general acknowledgment that
science with its mechanistic world view can not answer all of our questions, we
need to consider alternative approaches 1• The alternative approach that I will be
arguing for in this thesis is one that validates human experience as not merely a

thinking being, separate and distinct from our universe, but one of becoming,
involved and integrated within our universe. I will be drawing on examples of the
kind of experiences humans can have, and have had, that suggest our ordinary
worldview is flawed, that it is dominated by a divisive egotistical thinking
mind/brain that, in its effort to establish its own sense of subjective selfimportance, separates itself from a now objectivised world. I intend to
demonstrate that it is only because we are unable, in nonnal circumstances, to
experience the world in a holistic way, incorporating both subjectival and
objectival dimensions, that we mistake our shackled dualistic perspective for a

1

For further discussion see bibliography, in particular Griffin, Jacobs, de Quincey and Clarke.
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true interpretation of our universe and our relationship within it. Below is a brief
outline of my arguments for the thesis:

1) It is possible, and 1 suggest desirable, to have experiences in which our nonnal
perception, dominated by our thinking mind, ceases. I have referred to these
experiences as "personal panpsychic experiences". A "personal panpsychic
experience" is one in which the individual is no longer aware of the past or the
future, and consequently time appears to stand still.

It is ''panpsychic"

because the individual becomes aware that the mind has expanded to include
everything, leaving one with a deep sense of oneness or completeness. I will
argue that knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic experiences" is
epistemologically valid. That is, that ontological knowledge of unity and
wholeness, acquired under this kind of non-conceptualised personal
experience(s), is valid and needs to be taken into account when considering
the mind/body mind/matter problem.
2) As a result of having such experiences those persons come to see the world
differently from their previously established dualistically orientated worldview. The perceived dualism, from our nonnal experience of subject-objective
reality, can now be considered to be dual aspectivism. That is, by seeing the
world around us in light of the intuitive knowledge acquired through "personal
panpsychic experiences" we are able to understand that the dualism we
nonnally experience is simply a dual-aspect of the same thing, a universal
singularity.
3) From this position I will argue that everything that exists has both a mental
and a material aspect and that neither is ontologically real. The tenn I have
adopted to describe this perspective is the "dual-aspect singularity"
perspective. This perspective acknowledges the apparent dualism of mindmatter but argues that it is merely illusory, and, because this duality is illusory,
we are left with the conclusion that the nature of reality is singular. Even
though this account does not readily appeal to our nonnal rational mental
states of mind, which are subject to restrictive dualistic mental language, there
are ways of intuitively approaching the mind-matter dilemma. So the last part
of my argument in support of my thesis for a "dual-aspect singularity" is a
discussion about how we might be able to approach the mind/body paradox. I
II

assert that one of the ways we can intuitively understand this thesis is in the
application and consideration of the

Moebiu~

Principle. The Moebius

Principle is important to my argument because it demonstrates that there are
aspects and dimensions in reality that we have difficulty comprehending
through our nonnal senses, and yet obviously exist. Once the thesis is
accepted panpsychism can also be understood as a realistic and understandable
thesis in physical and mental tenns.

As you can see from the diagram in Appendix 1, I have located my
argument as an argument from realism. Although there might be a tendency to
claim my position is monistic, because of the "singularity" aspect, and therefore
should more appropriately be considered to be either idealistic r ~· ,, >tterialistic. To
consider either to be appropriate would be to miss the essential point that neither
matter nor mind is ontologically real. Further more, qualifying its monistic
tendency by suggesting it has a "dualwaspect" avoids any argument about what
exactly any monism might be made up of, either mind or matter. "Dualaspectivism" incorporates both. Neither matter nor mind holds supreme position
in the equation. They are considered to be, in simplistic tenns, both entirely
necessary in the construction of the real universe, even though they are aspects of
a "singularity" only.
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Chapter 1- The Panpsychism Thesis and the Debate
1.1 The Significa~e of the Panpsychism Debate
The significance of the pa.npsychic thesis can not in my view be overstated;
it is one of the niost important and excitin'g philosophical positions. The
arguments for and against the position address two unresolved queStions: What
exactly is the relationship between mind, as experienced by human beings, and

body, understood as a complex organisatian of matter? And how far, if8t all, ·::.1oes
this mind exte~d to other inaterial objects or penetrate into the structure of the
universe? Ideas on these problems range from one end of the p~ilosophicill

spectrum to the other. Prom the materialist's perspective, that the mind is purel~ a.
product of the brain, to the view that mind is separate from matter, and yet
somehow connected to it, and manifesting only as an epiphenomenon peculiar to
'

humans. The materialist's view holds that all is matter and. that out Of matter
everything is made manifest. Others see the world in dualistic tenns, of which
there are two basic types: "substance dualists," who think that mind and body
name two kinds of substances, and "property dualists," who think mind and body
are two separate properties·of one thing- a Kuman being for example ·(Searle,
1997, p.135). The other monistic perspective, the idealist's view, sa:ys that mind
may be considered as a unified whole, or God, and that matter is illusory~
It has been acknowledged by some of the current thinkers in this area that

there needs to be some kind of breakthrough in the mind~body debate before
further progress can be made. Thomas Nagel has said that the drive to 4evelop a
physicalist account of mind has led to "extremely implausible positions" (Griffin,
1998 p.4). Other authors have also pointed out the problems face4 in attempting to
resolve the mind-body question. David Chalmers rather eloquently sugiests that
"you can't have your materialist cake and eat your consciousness too" (Chalmers,
1996, p.28). Colin McGinn argues that our present perplexity is tenninal, that we
will never be able to resolve the mystery of how consciousness could emerge from
the brain. He says that "somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is
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turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a complete blank on the nature
of1his c?nVersion ... The mind-body problem is the prOblem of understanding how
this miracle is wrought" (McGinn, 1982, pp.99-120). 2 Dave Ray Griffin goes as
far as to suggest that a new and entirely radical approach is necessary to address
the problem, agreeing with Nagel,3 who asserts that "nothing but radical
speculation gives us hope of coming up with any candidates for truth", and Galen
Strawson,4 who declar~s thcit ''the enonnity oft~ mind-body problem" requires a

\

"radical solution" (cited in Griffin, 1998, p.5).
~anpsychism

has enjoyed a long controversial history, and has been

presentea in a variety of guises,, and fonnulations. Although the tenn itself is
relatively new, the concept has been around since ancient times, long preceding
any_ western philosophical systematic records. Versions of the thesis are well
recorded in Buddhist and Hindu texts. But, the first time the word 'Panpsychism'
was used in the English language, according to the Oxford English Dictionary,
,,

was in 1879,

in~

Edwards, in his

book by G. H. Lewes: Mind as a Function qfOrganism. Paul
exc~llent

but highly critical essay on panpsychism in The

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edwards, 1967), traces the lineage of eminent
'

thinkers in antiquity, where evidence of panpsychist ideas can be found endorsed
in the. teachings or _y.'ritings of "Presocratic" philosophers such as Thales,
Anaximenes, Pythagoras and Anaxagoras.
· The two most important, players in early modern panpsychism would have

• be Baruch Spinoza (1632-77) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716).
to
"Spinoza regarded both

mi~d

and matter as simply aspects (or attributes) of the

eternal, infinite and unique substance he identified with God" (Seager, 2001, p.5).
Leibniz, on the· Other hand, saw the cosmos as made up from many separate
substances he called monads. These monads he considered were essentially
mentalistic.

2

Other writers have made similar suggestions: WilliamS. Robinson, in Brains and People (1988),
suggests that there is no story that can account for the phenomenon of the experience of pain and
the relationship of brain neurones to pain. William Seager in Metaphysics of Consciousness, who
says that in spite of holding that physicalism "still deserves our allegiance" (p,224), he says that
"the degree of difficulty in fonnulating an explicate version of physicalism which is not subject to
immediately powerful objections is striking" (cited in Griffin, 1998, p.4).
~For a more detailed discussion see Thomas Nagel's A View from Nowhere (1986).
4
For a more detailed discussion see Galen Strawson 's Mental Reality (1994).
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It was Rene Descartes who, after his most famous assertion "I think
therefore I am," delivered the greatest blow to the panpsychic thesis. Cartesian
dualism posited the mind-body split; claiming that mind or souls are separate from
matter just because they have sentience, whereas "matter is a 'dumb' thing,
without intrinsic sentience" (de Quincey, 2002, p.21). This dualistic perspective
has had the effect of restricting our thinking and as a consequence our language,
leaving us to describe our world in objectival terms.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the thesis was extensively
discussed under the influence of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution, with one
of the more sensible discussions provided by William James (Clarke, 2003, p.vii).
In his 1890 publication of Principles of Psychology, James asserts, "If evolution is
to work smoothly, consciousness in some shape must have been present at the
very origin of things" (James, 1950, p.l49). He goes on to suggest that:
Each atom of the nebula, they (clear-sighted evolutionary p1tilosophers)
suppose, must have had an aboriginal atom of consciousness linked with it;
and, just as the material atoms have fonned bodies and brains by massing
themselves together, so the mental atoms, by an analogous process of
aggregation, have fused into those larger consciousnesses which we know in
ourselves and suppose to exist in our fellow animals.

James, of course was working from the cosmological knowledge of the day.
Yet even today, as Clarke (2003, p.viii) points out, ''the transition from bare
matter to material systems with a mental perspective on things remains an
unexplained puzzle." Others advocating some version of the panpsychic thesis
during this period were Royce, Lotze, and Schopenhauer, to name a few.
According to Clarke, whether influenced by Hegelian idealism or not, they all
regarded any philosophical endeavour in providing an explanation for matters
outside the scope of the empirical sciences as an essential mission of philosophy
(2004, p.l 07). Karl Popper, and A. J. Ayer, "regarded panpsychism as an obstacle
to the progress of scientific inquiiy," and according to Ayer, "meaningless" as it
violated what was referred to as the "verifiability criterion of meaningfulness"
(Clarke, 2004, p.107). In other words, "any meaningful hypothesis must be
caplble of being empirically tested."
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1.2 Terms Defined
The etymology of the tenn ''panpsychisrn" is the best place to start. Pan is
Greek for "all," and Psyche to the early Greek philosophers, means "soul," the

principle of life, distinguishing it from all that is inanimate or dead. In my thesis I
use the tenn consciousness to denote all levels of the human experience of
consciousness and mentality as cognitive activity within human consciousness.
The tenn mind, I suggest denotes that which is held as equal to, and married to
matter.

This is not a preliminary definition of a human mind. It is, rather, a

description that distinguishes the human experience of mentality from the broader
idea of mind being involved in all matter. Other authors have used these same
tenns but with different meanings. I have suggested the above to try to avoid
confusing the mental activity we experience in our everyday consciousness with
any kind of mentality that might go on outside our own consciousness. In
philosophy, in general, the mind-matter, mind-world, mind-body, and mind-brain
problems have been treated separately. In my thesis I~onsider them all to be one
and the same pmblem, that is, that "world" "body" and "brain" are all "matter,"
and that the duality of all those relationships is the problem, and not the various
kinds of matter discussed in those relationships.

1.3 Current Thinking: A Review
Little philosophical work has been carried out on panpsychism over the last
seventy years. The same cannot be said for the mind-body problem which has
been the subject of enormous debate since the nineteen sixties. It is possible to
count the number of serious contributors to the current panpsychism debate on
two hands. Although several other writers, whilst not providing a full scale
defence of panpsychism, have, nevertheless, been sympathetic towards it, when
dealing with the problem of consciousness (Seager, 2001, p.9). The philosophers
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that have vigorously entered the debate in recent times are authors such as David
Ray Griffin, Colin McGinn, Christian de Quincey, D. S. Clarke, Thomas Nagel,
Williain Seager, Timothy Sprigge, and Freya Mathews (For references see

bibliQb>raphy).
Any review of the current panpsychism argument, in its various fonns, and
with its various positions and conclusions, would not be complete without
acknowledging the works of philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, whose defence
of panpsychist philosophy in the early part of the twentieth century was
significant. After the publication of Whitehead's Process and Reality in 1929, and
along with a flourish of other works dealing with panpsychism, such as C.D.
Broad's Mind cmd Its Place in Nature in 1925, one would have expected an
ongoing robust and engaging debate to ensue. However, the debate was short
lived at that time. And, as Seager (2001, p.9) points out, the world took a different
direction. With the advent of such great advances in technology and science,
philosophical inquiry into the nature of reality was now deemed somewhat
unnecessary, and certainly, to the new wave of scientific materialists,
unwarranted, unless of course the results of such inquiry were science~ftiendly. In
anticipation that science would indeed sort out these problems of mind and matter,
and with the advent of a new logical positivist philosophy dominating
philosophical thinking at that time, nothing of any significance in tenns of a
philosophical defence of panpsychism happened for some fifty years.
The resurgence of interest in panpsychism is a relatively recent affair, for as
I have suggested, the matter lay resting, and some no doubt thought finally put to
bed, albeit unresolved. But, Whitehead's ideas of a "process" or "event"
orientated panpsychism nevertheless provided a springboard from which today's
panpsychism debate has sprung. Theologian and philosopher David Ray Griffin
prefers the term "panexperientialism" to describe this
(Griffin, 1998, pp.

27~116).

process~based

ontology

Also, ideas coming out of the new sciences, such as

Quantum and Complexity theories, did not put to rest any of the old questions
about the nature of reality; they simply, once reasonably understood, changed the
way we now think about the same old 'hard' problem questions.
It must be said, however, that there have been a few philosophers who were

reluctant to let things drop. The most important was Charles Hartshorne, whose
reformulation of Whitehead's technically cumbersome process philosophy kept
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the subject alive through those barren years, and provided present day
philosophers such as David Ray Griffin and Christian de Quincey with enough
grist to develop their own versions of the panpsychism argument. Griffin's
""panexperientialism" was derived from Whitehead's and Hartshorne's process
philosophy, and has much in common with de Quincey's "'radical naturalism"
which asserts that matter·energy is considered fundamental and real, but to its
roots intrinsically sentient (de Quincey, 2002, pp.217·218). Whitehead was not
happy with either the ""universal mechanism" model 5 that was being heavily
promoted at the end of the nineteenth century as the correct view of our natural
world, or with the alternative "humanism" model 6 derived from the Greek
philosophers and promoted through Descartes' Cartesian dualism (Clarke, 2003,
The problem Whitehead and many others had, and still have, with

p.30).

universal mechanism is that it seems inconsistent with our own self-evident
experience of a sense of freedom in our decision making, and subjectivity in
general.

Whitehead and Hartshorne on Process Philosophy
According to Clarke (2003, p.31), Whitehead's process or "events"
orientated philosophy was derived from Leibniz's Monadology. 7 After rejecting
the two dominant philosophical positions on the nature of reality as unacceptable,
Whitehead proposed replacing them with an unrestricted panpsychism.
Understanding that Leibniz's metaphysical system was flawed in that it didn't
explain fully or adequately the relationship between the mental and the physical,
Whitehead tried to correct these problems by replacing the concept of monads or

5

"Universal mechanism" holds that any event or behaviour, human or otherwise, has detennining
antecedent causes. In universal mechanistic tenns, mind, as an epiphenomenal experience, is the
direct result ofbrain activity.
6
The perspective of philosophical humanism holds that human beings are metaphysically different
from other lower fonns of life. It is dualistic in nature and Whitehead referred to this as the
"bifurcation of nature."
7
Leibniz's Monadology is based on the understanding that every appropriately organised body has
what Leibniz calls a "dominant monad", and any parts of this body in turn have their dominant
monads. Reality consists of arrangements of monads within monads ad infinitum. The regression
does not stop at simple particles •vithout parts, instead Leibniz suggests the concept of a "simple
substance", the most primitive of souls without extension or fonn. As each monad is a perfect
reflection of the universe, synchronised in a perfect hannony, therefore, there is no need for one
monad to act in any way upon another monad (Russell, 1946, pp.563-576).
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souls with psychic events called "actual entities" or "actual occasions." These
events had two component aspects or "poles": a physical aspect that relates to the
immediate environment and a conceptual aspect that allows for anticipating the
future (Whitehead, 1978,

pp.107~109).

Whitehead is trying to account for what

was then regarded by many as a natural "logic of relations" in causal processes. 8
However, some have been critical of Whitehead's adaptation of common tenns
used to describe his complex process philosophy. Clarke claimed that "ctifficulties
and uncertainties of interpretation serve to obscure the analogies that are the basis
for ascribing mentality to subhuman forms in a way required by panpsychism"
(Clarke, 2003, p.34). However, it has to be said, and is acknowledged by some of
the current philosophers in the panpsychism debate, that to see the universe in
terms of "events" rather than as a composite of individual particles has a certain
appeal to panpsychists. To see the cosmos as "cosmosing" rather than as a static
thing, to understand the universe as a verb rather than as a noun introduces,
according to Whitehead, subjectival interiority. 9 This idea clearly appeals to
modem philosophers seeking a new panpsychic/panexperiential direction.
Hartshorne refonnulated Whitehead's process philosophy, whilst retaining
his "conception of mentality as an ordered sequence of psychic events or
experiential occasions" (Clarke, 2003, p.37). He eliminates Whitehead's
technically complex tenninology, and instead of taking up Whitehead's notions of
Leibniz's monads, he used the tenn "feelings" to help describe these psychic
events, immediately making it possible to then argue for panpsychism from
analogy from human experience. He appeals to our own experiences of being lost
in "feeling", losing all sense of subject and object, in that, when so immersed in
the experience, subject and object become one. By analogy we are able to attribute
mentality or "feelings" to various other forms of natural life. But to what extent,
or at which point in the regression down through material life, can we take this
analogical argument? Arguments for panpsychism from human analogy become

8

See Bertrand Russell's chapter on Leibniz in HisiOIJ' of Weste/'11 Philosophy. Whitehead was well
aware of Russell's criticism ofLeibniz's metaphysical system. Whitehead was Russell's teacher
and mentor at Trinity College Cambridge in the 1890s.
<>Whitehead's process philosophy develops the idea that each event has both a subjectival and
objectival aspect in that it is seen as a process that allows for past "now" event to stream into the
now "now" event in order to produce the future "now" event. This "now'' event contains within it
both the physical pole of the past and now and the conceptual pole of the now and future, and as
such is both subjective and objective.
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pretty thin when we get down to simple molecular components or fundamental
particles, simply because we are organised structures made up from parts which
are also in themselves organised ·structures. The analogical extension of feelings
or mentality, when there is no observed learning behaviour at primitive levels, or
when the behaviour of fundamental particles is so different from our own, an
essential criterion for the argument from analogy, is not viably justified. 10 D. S.
Clarke rejects Hartshorne's appeal to indetenninacy as an indication of
spontaneous behaviour at the quantum level (a spontaneity that Hartshorne
declares is evidence of "faint degrees of feeling") on the grounds that 1) it does
not conform to the basically accepted view of the behaviour of quantum
particles 11 , and that 2) "feelings" can not be analogically extended into the
quantum world from human experience (Clarke, 2003, p.40).

Thomas Nagel
Thomas Nagel can be credited with fuelling the revival of the panpsychism
debate. In his book Mortal questions, he suggests four simple premises underlying
the concept of panpsychism. 1). Material composition: That no constituents
besides matter are needed in the many simple and complex ever-changing
arrangements in the universe. In other words, matter exists as the only building
substance of the universe, 2). Non-reductionism: That mental, or feeling, or desire
states, are not, or cannot be, reduced to physical properties. Mental subjective
states as well as physical objective states also exist. 3). Realism: That those states
are properties of the organism. 4). Non-emergence: That mind does not emerge
from the workings of the universe (Nagel, 1979, pp.lSl-182). Nagel suggests that
panpsychism seems to follow from these four premises. He makes the point that:
If the mental properties of an organism are not implied by any physical properties
but must derive from properties of the organism's constituents, then those
constituents must have non-physical properties from which the appearance of mental
properties follows ... (Nagel, 1979, p.\82).

10

See D. S. Clarke's chapter 2 "Versions ofPanpsychism", in Panpsychism and the Religious
Attitude (2003) and Hartshorne's appeal to Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle.
11
The indetenninacy of quantum particles is not attributable to anything internal to the particle
itself, as it is understood today, but is a result of an external observer.

20

He concludes that since any matter can compose an organism, all matter
must have these properties and that those different combinations of matter
produce different kinds of mental life as a kind of"mental chemistry."
Nagel goes on to discuss the various problems that the argument can
encounter in light of the four premises first postulated. From the perspective of
realism, "conscious mental states are real states of something" and Nagel admits
difficulties in establishing exactly what those mental states really are (Nagel,
1979, p.l93). Offering three alternative interpretations he finds dissatisfaction
with: I) that they are states of the body, 2) that they are states of the soul, and 3)
that all we can say about their essence is to give criteria or conditions for their
ascription, he asks: "But what is left?" He is ultimately led back to what he calls
the "weakest premise in the argument", realism, suggesting that it is more
plausible at the moment than its denial (Nagel, 1979, p.l93). He goes on to
suggest that by simply denying any of the premises postulated, panpsychism
becomes unacceptable as a solution to the mind-body problem. Denial of the first
premise results in dualism. Denial of the second premise, according to Nagel, is
motivated by the desire by philosophers to make the mind-body problem go away.
Denial of the third premise, realism, is in his view more attractive, but awaits
development of a viable alternative. And, denial of the fourth premise, nonemergence, results in very difficult questions about how, when and why mental
states arise.

David Ray Griffin's Panexperientialism
David Ray Griffin offers us an alternative to the cul-de-sac arguments
posited by both the materialists and the dualists that have dominated the debate to
the present. He makes the claim, borne out by the very recent flourish of authors
entering the fray that a new situation has arisen. It is a situation not resulting from
any

parf~ular

new discovery or decisive progress towards a solution to the

mind/body problem, but one that has arisen by default: recognition, from
prominent thinkers in this field, that it is unlikely that a solution will be found
under the current predominate paradigms. As previously mentioned in section 1.1,
Thomas Nagel has said that the drive to develop a physicalist account of mind has
21

led to "extremely implausible positions" (Griffin, 1998, p.4), and Colin McGinn
argnes that our present perplexity is tenninal, that we will never be able to resolve
the rnystery of how consciousness could emerge from the brain. He says:
"Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of
consciousness, but we draw a complete blank on the nature of this
conversion ... The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding how this
miracle is wrought" (McGinn, 1982, pp.99-120).

12

Griffin goes as far as to

suggest that a new and entirely radical approach is necessary to address the
problem, agreeing with Nagel, 13 who asserts that "nothing but radical speculation
gives us hope of coming up with any candidates for truth", and with Galen
Strawson, 14 who declares that "the enonnity of the mind-body problem" requires a
"radical solution" (cited in Griffin, 1998, p.5). Griffin's answer, although not
claiming to have a radical solution but rather a direction not leading into a cul-desac, is panexperientialism. 15
Panexperientialism takes the position that all individual instances of reality
in the universe are intrinsically experiential. It is the idea that the universe as such
is experiencing, and not only experiencing, but experiencing itself in its entirety,
penneating all levels of existence and being. 16 This way of thinking about the
world, although difficult at first for those who are used to seeing and thinking in
dualistic terms, at least allows for a different approach to the "hard problem", or
"world knot" as Griffin calls it. Colin McGinn, arguing from a background in
analytical philosophy, claims that the problem of consciousness is closed to
human understanding (de Quincey, 2002, p.l85). McGinn denies we have the
cognitive capacity for understanding the nature of the interaction between mind
and body, even though he accepts the plain and obvious fact that the interaction
exists. Griffin on the other hand believes the mind-body problem is amenable to
rational analysis.

12

See note 2.
For a more detailed discussion see Thomas Nagel's A View from Nowhere (1986)
14
For a more detailed discussion see Galen Strawson's Menial Realily (1994)
15
Griffin prefers this term "panexperientialism" for two reasons: (1) The tenn "psyche" suggests
that the basic units endure through long stretches of time, whereas they maybe momentary
experiences; and (2) "psyche" inevitably suggests a higher fonn of experience than would be
afpropriate for the most elementary units of nature (Griffin, 1998, p.78).
1
"Pan" means "all of', "everywhere'', or "the whole", or "universal". Therefore pan-experience
means experience as an ingredient all through the universe, penneating all levels of being, and
incorporating a degree of subjective interiority (de Quincey, 2002, p.l83).
13
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De Quincey attempts to steer a line of argument that acknowledges
McGinn's assertion that it is beyond human rationality to deduce a solution, but
appeals to Griffin's notion in that it is knowable, albeit in an intuitive sense. De
Quincey claims that:

In order to know consciousness, and to know the relation between consciousness
and the physical world, we will need to cultivate an alternative epistemology
beyond the faculties of rational analysis and conceptual understanding.(de
Quincey, 2002, p.187)

Christian de Quincey's Radical Naturalism
In Christian de Quincey's book Radical Nature: Rediscovering the Soul in

Maller, he puts forward a strong argument for radical naturalism being the only
real and viable solution to the puzzle of consciousness in matter, the "hard
problem". This puzzle is not resolvable, he claims, by holding onto the "old
story". The "old story" is de Quincey's tale of mechanism that posits matter as
dead and insentient, a story based on ontological dualism that has been built
slowly over the ages and handed down to us as scientifically based fact. It has
been recognised, however, that the story's major premise: that matter is dead and
devoid of consciousness, is also its major problem, because we do have minds.
Which in tum raises the issue: how can mind emerge from matter if matter is
inherently dead without mind? How can something that is inherently subjective
realise itself out of something that is objectively dead? This old mechanistic story
that matter is dead and insentient, and the phenomenon of mind as experienced by
humans is merely the result of some kind of epiphenomenon of brain activity, is
no longer acceptable to de Quincey. Let it be noted here, as de Quincey does, that
Neo-Darwinians such as Richard Dawkins still argue that alllife-fotms were the
sole result of chance mutations, and the blind selection of a dumb and "blind
natural watchmaker" 17 , and that mind, soul or consciousness was viewed as a ''by
product of chance events in mechanit;:al nature" (de Quincey, 2002, p.23). But, de
Quincey says, the story started to unravel when "gaps or anomalies in the
17

See Richard Dawkins' book The Blind Watchmaker (1986).
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mechanistic worldview appeared with the advent of the new sciences
relativity, 18 quantum, and complexity theories"

19

(2002, p.24). Einstein may have

started this re-understanding of the nature of matter, but the greatest challenge to
the 'old story' so far, as de Quincey points out, is Quantum theory. If, as de
Quincey points out, the universe can not be so observed without the observer
affecting the actual event being observed, then how can the universe be
objectified, a prerequisite for the mechanistic scientific method? De Quincey puts
it like this: "Clearly, if the subjectivity or the consciousness of an observer is
somehow responsible for 'collapsing' quantum probabilities into an actual event,
objectivity is compromised at a fundamental level" (de Quincey, 2002, p.26). Not
only do quantum events collapse into being; they are also unpredictable and
indeterminable. 20 This, de Quincey rightly observes, brings into question the
whole notion of a scientifically measurable observable universe.
We cannot control that of which we are a part, without ourselves
participating in the outcome(s). Because, as de Quincey points out, "every part
contributes to the changes of the whole, and therefore the parts themselves" (de
Quincey, 2002, p.31). De Quincey asserts that the old story is severely
compromised, with "the old ideals of mechanism, reductionism, causaldeterminism, and objectivity undermined" (2002, p.33).

18

Einstein's theory of relativity, although not suggesting any need for sentience, subjectivity, or
consciousness in matter, did start to break do'Ml the generally accepted view of a mechanistic
universe made up from solid particles of 'stuff' or 'things'. Einstein presented a picture of events
(energy) rather than things (solid matter). A picture, not of"solid little bits of matter interacting
mechanistically", but of"swirling dances and fluxes of energy exchanges" (de Quincey, 2002,
p,.24).
9
Experiments in "quantum mechanics" have demonstrated that two subatomic physical events
occurring at the same time and related, that respond to each other, can happen even when they are
at a 'super-luminal' distance. In other words, requiring communication beyond light speed contact.
Further, quantum events occur, that is to say the world of actualities manifests, only when they are
ob.~erved, in that, in the quantum universe it is the observer that collapses the quantum gaps (these
gaps or waves contain "an infinite sea of quantum potential") into actuality (de Quincey, 2002,
p.25). In these theories, quantum and chaos, it becomes meaningless to isolate individual parts- a
cornerstone in mechanism theories, for everything relates to the whole.
20
This indeterminacy, intrinsic to quantum events, has been expressed in Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle (Heisenberg, 1958). The principle in effect states that it is impossible to
predict, or measure with one hundred percent accuracy, where, at any given time, a particle is or
will be in time and space and, as de Quincey suggests, this uncertainty is ontological, not merely
epistemological uncertainty.
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D. S. Clarke
D. S. Clarke asserts that the only realistic position to take when we are

considering mentality/mind and its relation to matter is the view supported by his
"Origination Argument", and that is that mind/mentality has always existed. The
argument from analogy allows us to consider the idea that mind is not unique to
humans. By analogy we are able to posit that other life fonns, whether they are

complex or somewhat less complex, have mentality. But, we are hard pressed to
extend that analogy down into the world of fundamental particles, as there is very
little, if anything, that could be considered analogous with human behaviour,
except possibly the observed spontaneity or freedom with which these particles

appear to move.
Clarke's discussion regarding extending the panpsychist thesis down to
fundamental particles admits this difficulty in establishing an analogical link to
these universal building blocks. "Fundamental particles by definition are not
organised wholes with parts," he says, "they are individuals persisting through
time, but individuals so different in nature as to apparently exclude them from the
scope of the panpsychist thesis" (Clarke, 2003, p.112). The problem is, as he notes
later, if we exclude fundamental particles from the thesis, we have undennined the
Origination Argument and are left with the same problem the argument is
supposed to solve. De Quincey on the other hand actively promotes Quantum
theory in relation to fundamental particles, as it turns the universal picture 'upside
down' in terms of the way we have observed and consequently theorised, in the
past, about the nature of matter. De Quincey uses the ideas surrounding the
behaviour of fundamental particles to refute the mechanist account of reality.
Quantum theory, he suggests, threatens all notions about casual activity, as
quantum events are 'non-local' and 'non-causal', in that they are unhindered by
distance (de Quincey, 2002, p.25). 21 Clarke, on the other hand, appears to leave
the matter of mind in fundamental particles somewhat unresolved, with an appeal
to the incomplete knowledge of contemporary physics, suggesting that these
fundamental particles might some day be discovered to be wholes with parts,
hence allowing the argument from analogy to stretch down to them.

21

See note 17.
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Clarke rejects the argument from universal mechanism that applies to
evolutionary theory in an attempt to explain the origination of mentality or
consciousness. Clarke (2003, pp.l06-107), citing Fred Dretske, writes: "What
natural selection starts with as raw material are organisms with assorted needs
and variable resources for satisfying these needs. You don't have to be conscious
to have needs." The argument here is that you don't have to be conscious to have
needs but you do have to have needs to become conscious. In other words, the
epiphenomenon of mind is an evolutionary response to human need as we
evolved. Clarke counters this with the observation that the need to process
infonnation, the claimed precedent cause for mentality, and the ability to process
infonnation could have just as easily produced a zombie or "robot-like
combinations of molecules with the capacity for differential responses that also
lacked mentality" (Clarke, 2003, p.I08). The point that Clarke is trying to make
in response to universal mechanism's evolutionary argument, is that you can not
treat mentality as if were similar to the hom on a rhinoceros; acquired through
evolution, rather pretty to look at, handy when under attack, but could probably
get along just fine without it. Clarke claims that the evolutionary theory of the
advent of mentality does not adequately account for the antecedent or origination
of consciousness. "We are confronted," he asserts (Clarke, 2003, p.llO), "with a
totally new aspect apparently without biological explanation for its origination."
Following this and the apparent ongoing inability of mechanists to provide a
reasonable explanation, including Daniel Dennett's attempt, 22 Clarke asserts that
the only plausible alternative, apart from Locke's notion of a Universal Mind 23
that he subsequently rejects, is the Origination Argument.

22
Daniel Dennett, in his book Darwin's Dangerous Idea, makes the claim that the origination of
mentality is simply another evolutionary stage in the progression from primitive to more complex
fonns of organisation, with this progression to be explained by the combination of random genetic
variation and forces of natural selection ofDanvinian evolutionary theory (Clarke, 2003, p.I03).
23
Locke's argument for God's existence is founded on the fact of our own experience of our own
selves. Locke asserts: "Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our
own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth, that there
is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing being; which whi!ther any one will please to call
God, it matters not" (Locke, 1959, Bk IV, Ch X, p.6).
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Freya Mathews
Freya Mathews approaches the problem from a different perspective.
Although claiming, as de Quincey does, that the old story is flawed in that it
presupposes dualistic misconceptions, Mathews argues for a more personal and
intimate relationship between ourselves and our universe. In her book, For the

Love of Matter, Mathews develops a version of panpsychism that holds that the
physical universe is an indivisible unity organised along the lines of a

self~

realising system. She claims that our responses to environmental crisis and our
current environmental philosophy are flawed as they are based on misconceived
assumptions. She uses the term panpsychism to describe a truly non~dualistic view
of matter that "implicates the mentalistic in the material" (Mathews, 2003, p.27).
From this panpsychist perspective, all of reality has a subjectival dimension.
Having a subjectival dimension is to say that matter, and all physical existence,
are imbued with an inner principle that can be described in terms of subjectivity

(Mathews, 2003, p.34).
Mathews argues that any adequate philosophical response to the
'environmental crises' cannot be encompassed within the minor discipline of
environmental philosophy alone, but must instead appeal to a philosophical
understanding that would address the full range of existential questions. She
asserts that the Western retreat from a panpsychist ethos of "encounter" may be
seen as a consequence of the Western experience of individuation, a direct and
consequential result of a dualistic perspective. She urges us towards a more
"passionate" and "erotic" encounter with the world, using a mythological and
spiritual approach entwined with her arguments for a panpsychic worldview.
Most of the philosophical debate concerning dualism has in the main
centred on the relationship between mind and body in sentient beings and not
around matter per se. As Mathews points out, matter per se remains, for most
thinkers, the province of physics, and, as such, captive to the old dualistic
presuppositions (Mathews, 2003, p.26). She holds that even though few scientists
or philosophers these days subscribe to a dualistic theory of mind, in the sense of
regarding mind as existing completely independently of matter, most of us still
have a dualist way of seeing the world held together by old dualistic
presuppositions. Mathews claims that materialism and idealism are in fact flip
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sides of dualism itself, since "materiality is dualistically conceived from the
perspective of materialism and ideality is dualistically conceived from the
perspective of idealism" (Mathews, 2003, p.26).
Mathews defends her argument for panpsychism from the perspective of
realism, suggesting that subjectivity, as a field (of selfMpresence), as such, is
ultimately indivisible. Although, bearing in mind that all material objects can be
said, from a panpsychist perspective, to have a subjectival dimension, it is not true
to say of all objects that they are subjects (Mathews, 2003, p.33). The idea that the
universe is imbued with both subjectival and objectival dimensions is central to
Mathews' ,argument for a panpsychist perspective of the universe. She asserts that
"subjectivity is that field of self-presence out of which awareness springs" (2003,
p. 7~). Although such self-presence is here ascribed to reality at large, she makes
the point that it may be understood in "systems-theoretic terms" as a function of
reflexivity of certain kinds of systems, namely those capable of making
themselves the object or goal of their own activities. Such systems, which she
describes as "selves", are, in other words, systems that are directed to their own
perpetuation. They are, she says, in this sense, "selfMreferential" (2003, pp.47-48).
According to Mathews the universe has to be able to refer to itself. This
referentiality must occur at the level of intention, if it is to "pick itself out of the
domain of possibilities and select itself for actualisation". She goes on to explain
it further. "It is on account of the necessary self-referentiality that reality is as

irreducibly subjectival as it is physical" (2003, p. 74). In order to explain how the
universe is constellated as such Mathews argues that as there can be no others
external to itself to which the world can reach out, it creates such others out of the
fabric of itself. It is as if in reaching out for another it finds only itself, as it is only
One, and has no other choice other than to create that which it reaches for. These
others, of its own creation, Mathews asserts, consist of finite sub-systems that are
also relatively self-realising: "out ofthe primordial desire of the global system/self
an endless stream of relatively individuated finite systems/selves is constellated"
(2003, p.74).
Mathews makes the claim that it is fair to assume that the universe is selfrealising, and it follows that any universe that is selfMrealising is to the same
extent self-actualising, otherwise how would it come into existence? But if
something can bring itself into existence, then it must also be selfwreferential,
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since it is itself that it brings into existence (2003, p.52). And, any universe that
has a

self~referential

capacity entails that it necessarily has a subjectival

dimension. It can be said that being a self-realising system, it proposes reflexivity
and to this extent the universe is imbued with a subjectival dimension. This
universal subjectivity, that Mathews promotes, is as fundamental to its
metaphysical nature as is its physicality since its physicality is given only in the
context of the self~referentiality, the reflexivity, required for its self~actualisation.
According to Mathews (2003,

pp.60~61),

the "capacity of self-referentiality

admits of twin aspects" and she has chosen two tenns to help describe what she is
getting at here: the "conative" and the "orectic". Conatus is the will to selfrealisation and

self~preservation,

self-maintenance, and self-increase. Orexis, a

Greek word meaning appetite, but including three conceptualised functions:
desire, spirit, and wish, is the impulse to reach out to world. She describes it as
"the desire for contact and connection with other-than-self' (Mathews, 2003,
pp.60-61).

According to Mathews, the interiority of matter can not be without drive or
purpose. Understanding this, Mathews has attempted to find suitable tenns in an
effort to capture these conceptual ideas. There not only has to be selfreferentiality, conativity, and its necessary subjectival capacity attributed to a
systems framework, but there also has to be some kind of drive or will or desire,
in order that it moves, evolves, always inviting change. Evolution simply would
not work without such drives or capacities. The world would not tum. The
universe would be static, standing still, nil.

In a systems framework these

capacities or drives, conativity and orexis are dialectically entwined, and she
explains that the "conativity of the global self drives the cosmological expansion
of space whilst its orectivity manifests as the

self~differentiation

of the physical

manifold" (Mathews, 2003, p.73). She describes it as the self seeking both to
articulate itself, distinguishing itself from its ontological matrix, and at the same
time to lose itself, subsiding back into that matrix by mixing itself with others.
And she makes the point that indeed, in order to articulate itself the self must enter
into relations of mutuality with elements of its environment (Mathews, 2003,
p.59). It (the universe) must respond to the orectic imperative, the 'self reaching
out. And she makes a vital point here, that one cannot be separated from the other,
since orexis is itself an expression of intentionality, and is hence the province of a
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self, it can make itself felt only within a conative context. Conatus and orexis thus
converge in the need of selves to engage in basically mutualistic relations.
In trying to capture the

inter~relationships

in the cosmos, Mathews has

borrowed from the ancient Chinese wisdom teachings of the Way, the Tao, to help
her describe what she refers to as "The Way of the One and the Many". This Way
is the means by which the Many, so long as they are left to follow the orectic
course of their innate conatus, promote the selfwincrease of the One (Mathews,
2003, p.64). According to Mathews, this gives rise to:

... the metaphysical pattern of mutual self-articulation that unfolds when global self
(the One) and finite selves (the Many) are allowed to follow their inner most
promptings to engage mutualistical\y with one another. Given the conative vector at
the core of creation, a tendency to generate ever-deeper possibilities of selfrealisation will be discernible in the unfolding of world (Mathews, 2003, p. 74).

Se]fwincrease, gives rise to the possibility of self-decrease and Mathews
explains how this, in some sense, is self-controlling. As any individual
subjectival entities whose

self~realisation

causes self-decrease in the wider

system will be "selected out of creation, not by conscious fiat, but by the
exquisite ecological logic of the Way" (Mathews, 2003, p.66). However,
Mathews asserts, since

inter~subjective

forms of contact and connection exceed

merely appetitive forms in the degree of "self-potentiation" they are capable of
producing the tendency towards self-increase, rather than self-decrease, and will
translate into an evolution oflevels of awareness that allow for eros in additton to
appetite. The Way of the One and the Many is thus, according Mathews,
ultimately a path of erotic adaptation to reality.

1.4 Monism, Dualism and Non-dual Dualism
In the literature review we have traced the argument for a ..dualistic"
mind/body relationship through to the "panexperiential" "non-dual duality"
perspective. But, like the paradox of the disappearing mast outlined in section 2.2,
there is something absurd about a notion of a ''non-dual duality". D. S. Clarke
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posits his argument for panpsychism, the "Origination Argument", that is that
mind/mentality has always been there, is based on his assertio;1 that it is the only
realistic position to take when we are considering mentality/mind and its relation
to matter. Both his argument from realism and the argument from analogy allow
us to consider, with confidence, the idea that mind is not unique to humans. By
analogy we are able to posit that other life fonns, whether they are complex or
somewhat less complex:, have mentality. But, as Clarke notes, we are hard pressed
to extend that analogy down into the world of fundamental particles, as there is
very little, if anything, that could be considered analogous with human behaviour,
except possibly the observed spontaneity or freedom with which these particles
appear to move. But surely. if the "Origination Argument" has any merit we must
ascribe subjective mentality to even the smallest fundamental particles. Otherwise
we are still dealing with the problems associated with emergence and ultimately
some fonn of dualism. And that is where Clarke has failed to convince. Unless the
apparent dualistic relationship between mind and matter can be sufficiently
explained you still have some fonn of dualism, in this case a "non-dual dualism."
In Chapter 2, I will explain that with the "dual-aspect singularity" argument, mind
and matter are the same thing. Mind does not emerge from matter and matter does
not emerge from mind. They cannot be separated, as you cannot have one without
the other. Any appearance of interaction between mind and matter is an
experience of the singularity's dual-aspect. Mind and matter only appear as being
separate.
Why does this solution, the "dual-aspect singularity" argument, work when
other solutions such as monism, dualism, and non-dual duality, have not? Because
it recognises the basic dualistic nature of our perceived world but understands it as
"dualistic aspectivism." That is, two aspects of the same thing. Neither materialist
nor idealist monism provided an adequate philosophical base. Monistic
materialism fails because it has been unable to account for mental facts. Once all
the material facts have been deducted from the universe there appears to be certain
undeniable mental facts left over that refuse to be reducible to material states.
Monistic idealism fails for two different reasons 1). Idealism's association with
pantheism and theism in general has muddied the waters, as it introduces the issue
of good and evil and their relationship with God, perfect or otherwise. Dealing
with problems of good and evil and providing an adequate explanation of the
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obvious dualistic nature of the universe has found most philosophers declaring
various fonnulations of monistic idealism indefensible (Levine, 1994, p.217). 2).
Monistic idealism also has trouble explaining away matter just as monistic
materialism has trouble explaining away mind.
One might suggest that the problem with monism is that we have difficulty
in pulling it apart to explain the dualistic nature of the universe and, likewise, the
problem with dualism is that we have difficulty in sticking it back together again.
Just as monistic materialists spend a lot of time and effort trying to prove mind
does not exist in mental tenns, so too do dualists, who spend an awful lot of time
attempting to explain the relationship between mind and matter once both have
acknowledged existence. It can be argued that the

'"dual~aspect

singularity" is a

fonn of monism, rather than a dualism, and this would be true. But, it is a monism
that has not taken sides. The "dual-aspect singularity" is neither matter nor mind.
Yet both are the dual aspects of it.
The pure materialist would say nature may appear dualistic but everything
in it can be reduced to matter, therefore there is only matter here. Most scientists
and mainstream philosophers hold this materialist position. The problem is, as we
have previously suggested, after all the

so~called

material facts have been added

up, there seems to be a lot of other stuff, mental facts left over. These mental facts
are a problem for materialists, as they do not readily reduce down to matter.
Mental facts might be beliefs, desires or pains, etc. How to hang onto the basic
tenets of materialism and at the same time explain mentality has been a quandary
for many philosophers. As we will discuss in the second part of this thesis, the
"dual-aspect singularity" argument has none of the above mentioned problems as

it explains the dual nature of reality, but resolves that duality into a singularity by
understanding it as a dual~aspectivism.
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Chapter 2 - Experiencing the Whole Picture

2.1 Personal Knowledge: Epistemologically Valid or Not?

In the current panpsychism debate due consideration of actual panpsychic
experiences, in the sense that I am proposing, has not been taken into account. A
"panpsychic personal experience" is one in which mind and matter are
experienced as one. It is an experience that is usually initiated by some kind of
crisis, as described in the preface, or one that can happen when one is in deep

contemplation or meditation, as recorded by Christian, Buddhist, Hindu and other
practitioners, as well as by modem psychologists or individuals who practice
meditation or deep forms of concentration. Freya Mathews' appeal to a more
joyful and intimate relationship with the world on a personal level moves the
debate in that direction, as she urges us towards a "passionate" and ''erotic"
encounter with the world, but she fails to analyse the experience in a way that
need not appeal to passion or eroticism. A state of deep concentration and
meditation requires neither.
My thesis for a

"dual~aspect

singularity" as a conceptualised perspective of

the mind/body mind/matter relationship, a conundrum when considered in
"dualistic" or "non-dual dualistic" terms, is an attempt to provide a definitive
description of the mind/body mind/matter mind/world relationships. This
perspective can be intuitively arrived at following what I have termed a "personal
panpsychic experience". This type of experience has been well researched.
Psychologist Abraham Maslow spent the latter part of his career studying and
writing extensively about what he called "peak experience." Maslow describes
characteristics of the peak experience:

1.

Perception is relatively ego-less. The individual fuses with objects into a new,
larger whole. Objects are seen as free lium relations, purpose, or usefulness to
anything else.

2.

Awareness of the past and future is lost. The person lives only in the moment,
totally immersed in the here-and-now. A distortion of time and space occurs.
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3.

Nonual, everyday consciousness is widened and enriched, and one feels that
one has experienced a higher, more direct state of consciousness, that one has
perceived the true essence of things. (cited in Jacobs, 2003, p.70)

As Maslow points out, the ego orientated "l" disappears, or as he puts it, it
"fuses with objects into a new, larger whole", and "our dualistic perception
dissolves into a single experience (Jacobs, 2003, p.70)." I have given further
examples of "personal panpsychic experiences" in section 2.4 of this thesis. After
having had this type of experience myself, along with several years of meditative
practice, I have come to the conclusion that 1) everything that exists has both a
mental and a material aspect that allows for both objectival and subjectival
capacities; 2) that neither the mental nor the material are onto logically real; and 3)
that the nonnal experience of reality is dualistic, but reality itself is singular and
indivisible.
I will now argue that the way to understand the mind/matter relationship is
to consider the non-conceptualised experience of wholeness and unity, as defined
in this thesis and described by Maslow, as reality and self-evident as long as it is
grounded in the moment of the experience. If it can then be demonstrated that the
experience is available to anyone who so chooses to pursue it through well
documented methods, and if the records of those who have had the experience are
also well documented, then this adds weight to my thesis. It provides us with a
solution that allows the debate to move forward yet still acknowledges the
dualistic nature of reality as we experience it in everyday life. I offer my argument
for a "dual-aspect singularity" in three parts:

1) That knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic experiences" is
epistemologically valid. That is, that ontological knowledge of unity and
wholeness, acquired under certain kinds of non-conceptualised personal
experience(s), which I have called "personal panpsychic experie1_1ces", is
epistemologically valid and needs to be taken into account when considering
the mind/body mind/matter problem.
2) That the perceived dualism, from our nonnal experience of subject~objective
reality, is merely dual-aspectivism. That is, that by seeing the world around us
in light

of the knowledge acquired through

"personal panpsychic
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experiences," knowledge that is epistemologically valid, we are justified to
understand the dualism we normally experience as simply dual-aspectivism, a
dual aspect of the same thing, a universal singularity.
3) That the nature of some dilemmas puts them beyond our normal rational
mental states of mind, which are subject to restrictive dualistic mental
language, and as such we are often unable to resolve intuitively based
ki1owledge problems. So the last part of my argument in support of my thesis
for a "dmtl-aspect singularity" is a discussion about how we might be able to
approach ihe mind/body paradox. I assert that one of the ways we can
intuitively understand this thesis is in the application and consideration of the
Moebius Principle. The Moebius Principle is important to my argument
because it demonstrates that there are aspects and dimensions in reality that
we have difficulty comprehending through our nonnal senses, and yet they
obviously exist. Once the "dual-aspect singularity" thesis is accepted,
panpsychism can also be understood as a realistic and understandable thesis in
physical and mental terms.

1). Ontological knowledge of unity and wholeness, acquired under certain

kinds of non-conceptualised personal experience(s), "personal panpsychic
experiences," is epistemologically valid and needs to be taken into account when
considering the mind/body mind/matter problem. I argue that these particular
"personal panpsychic experiences" are in fact epistemologically justifiable and
can be claimed as rational as they do in fact adhere to the criteria demanded by the
"evidentialists"

24

where it applies. "Classical foundationalism,"25 broadly

speaking, is the epistemological requirement that any belief should be supported
by evidence that is self-evident, or evident to the senses, or incorrigible. I argue
that the kinds of panpsychic experiences we are taking about are self-evident, in
that once understood one sees them as true. It is evident to the senses in that it is
not based on a conceptualised argument 9r thing, but is a real life event or
24

'Evidentialism', the roots of which can be found in the Enlightenment demand that all beliefs be
subjected to searching criticism of reason; if a belief cannot survive the scrutiny of reason, it is
irrational (Clark, 2004, p.2)
25
'Classical Foundationalism' is the demand that belief in God, or belief in anything rational,
should be support by a foundation of certitudes that in general have to comply to the following:
that the belief is self-evident, that it is evident to the senses, or that it is incorrigible (Clark, 2004,
p.3).
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experience in which one participates completely. I will go so far as to argue that in
fact there is a heightening or enhancing of the senses. And, I will argue that it is
incorrigible in that once experienced the world will always appear as "one" and
"whole" to the individual.
There can be no realistic argument in my view against the first condition: it
is sufficient for a "belief'' to be considered rational if it is

self~evident.

For one

thing I am presenting this type of knowledge, not as a "belief," but as direct
ontological knowledge or knowledge acquired as a result of a real experience. As
it is self-evident to the one who has had the experience it is therefore deemed
rational. If I knowingly step into a hot bath the result of which is that I am now
hot, that knowledge that I am hot requires no rationality assessment. I know I am
now hot. It is only if I need to explain the experience to another, say a child for
instance, then I might appeal to rationality. The bath is hot; if you get in you will
feel hot. But, again it will only become evident to the child when he or she gets
into the bath. Until such time any "belief' the child might have about the hot
water is conjecture and open to question and demand for evidence.
One possible argument against the idea that "personal panpsychic
experiences" are

self~evidential

is that the knowledge of "unity" gained from such

experiences is not available (to be

self~evident)

to anyone who has not had the

experience just like the child who does not get into the bath. This may be true but
this can not be a valid argument against the notion itself, but rather an
acknowledgment that for those who have no self-evidentiary experience of a
panpsychic nature the matter becomes one of"belief'' only. Just as the child who
refuses to believe the water is hot, but instead insists the water is cold, but refuses
to get into the bath, the onus is now on the child to provide a rational explanation
for the belief that the water is cold when it is in fact hot, rather than on the person
who simply experienced a hot bath.
On the second point that it is a sufficient condition for a belief to be rational
if it is evident to the senses, I reiterate that it is not a conceptualised belief but an
actual experience that takes place. One might argue that it is not evident to the
senses because the experience might be considered elusive or in some sense
visionary. It is true that during these experiences the senses are not operating in
nomtal mode so to speak. As we shall see later from descriptions, time seems to
slow down. Solid objects such as mountains and walls may appear penetrable and
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plastic. And, as the sense of "I" fades away, I smell, I see, I hear etc., become a
redundant relationship, because the smell, or the sight, or the noise, and I, become
one and the same. Subject and object merge together into a unity. If anything I
would suggest that the senses become enhanced.
The only counter arguments to the above might be one of questionable
sensory perception. Like the child who does not get into the bath we might also
suggest that the person having the experience has got it wrong, that their senses
"
have misinterpreted the event. But, these experiences
are well documented if not
well understood. Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, a psychologist, after interviewing
literally thousands of individuals over a twenty year period, describes in his book

Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience, that when people have these
optimal experiences, most report that time proceeds much faster than usual; hours
seem to pass by in minutes. In Csikszentmihalyi' s words:
What slips below the threshold of awareneSs is the concept of selL People stop being
aware of themselves as separate from the actions they are perfonning. And being
able to forget temporarily who we are seems to be very enJoyable. Loss of the sense
of a self separate from the world around it can lead to a feeling of union with the
environment, self-transcendence, and a feeling that the boundaries of our being have
been pushed forward, so that the person is transported into a new reality, to
previously undreamed-of states of consciousness. (cited in Jacobs, 2003, p.69)

As we are talking about a sensory experience, one that is well documented
and recognised as such, any argument against it not being evident to the senses
would surely fail.
On the third point that it is incorrigible: I argue that one is left in no doubt
about the validity of the experience, and that the ''personal panpsychic
experience" is grounded in "real" experience. It is not merely a state of euphoria,
although one might feel euphoric at the same time. If I were to suggest that the
world seems to be "one" or "whole", then seeming to be "one" could be
considered not incorrigible, for tomorrow it may seem different. But, again the
experiences we are suggesting are not "seeming to be" or "it appears as if' type
beliefs or assertions. They are well-documented "direct experiences" of reality
once the cognitive part of the brain shuts off. As Dr Gregg Jacobs points out, in
his book The Ancestral Mind: "A hallmark of the mystical state is an intuitive
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sense of 'realness' in which one 'sees' rather than thinks. The world is perceived
more directly, and the vividness and richness of nonnal waking consciousness are
greatly enhanced" (Jacobs, 2003, p.72). The belief one forms from "personal
panpsychic experiences" are incorrigible because they are direct knowledge
experiences. After the experience, one is left in no doubt about the experience,
just as the experience of a hot bath leaves no doubt about the temperature of the
bath water.

2). In the second part of my thesis I argue that perceived dualism is merely
dual-aspectivism. This is my assertion: that by perceiving the world around us in
light of the knowledge acquired through "personal panpsychic experiences" we
are able to understand dualism as simply dual-aspects of the same thing, a
universal singularity.
The cognitive part of our minds constantly reinforces the dualistic nature of
our world. We see our world as object. In an ordinary state of everyday
consciousness we feel separate from the world and experience it as such. Even the
language we use supports this view. "I love you," "You made me angry," "I see
the mountain" etc. We experience the world as in "relationship" to us, and our

.

mentality is very good at relationships. But this "I" that I associate with "myself'
or "me" can be considered somewhat of a philosophical mystery. Peter Strawson
in his chapter "Persons, "26 asserts that "the I occurs in philosophy through the
fact that the 'world is my world.' The philosophical "I" is not the man, not the
human body, or the human soul...but the metaphysic8:l subject, the limit- not a
part of the world" (cited in LeDoux, 2002, p.I9). MY argument is that the "I"
asserts itself when we are using our reasoning or 'cognitive mentality and
consequently disappears when we are simply just being. In a state of deep
meditation, as we can see from the examples I provide in the thesis, all mental
chatter (thinking) ceases. The thinking "I" no longer dominates our coqscious
interaction with the world and we are simply being. My assertion is that being is a
"one thing" experience, whereas thinking is always a "two things" e~eri~nce. In
thinking we are able to divide, separate, and isolate. In being, once thinking has ·

26

Strawson, P. 1959. In Individuals. London: Methuen
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ceased and is no longer able to create a veil of dualism, we are simply whole and
experience the world as such.
We have evolved and survive today as either an individual or as a species in
part because of our ability to handle relationships. The human mind isn't just
cognitive but also has several other states of consciousness, such as subconscious
or emotional states. According to LeDoux, cognitive scientists now reject the view
handed down from Descartes that mind and consciousness are the same thing
(LeDoux, 1996, p.29). They recognise that there are many levels of consciousness
within mind and this has given rise to a whole new area of cognitive research
sometimes referred to as "emotional intelligence". This realisation that mind is
more than just cognition and that there is a direct correlation between the mind
and the biological self still has cognitive researchers and consequently
philosophers puzzling for an adequate and philosophically descriptive solution.
Antonio Damasio, Van Allen Distinguished Professor and head of neurology at
the University of Iowa, summed up his latest perspective on the mind body
relationship after years of research: " ... the mind is part of that well-woven
apparatus. In other words, body, brain and mind are manifestations of a single
organism" (Damasio, 2003, p.195).
This "single organism" simply creates the "I" in order to get the cognitive
job done, and in so doing, and by default, generates its own division, creating its
own duality. There is no duality; there is simply a dual aspect of the one and the
same thing.
3). This leads me to my third point; that the nature of some dilemmas puts
them beyond our normal rational mental states of mind, which are subject to our
restrictive dualistic mental language, as such we are unable to resolve intuitively
based knowledge problems. So the last part of my argument in support of my
thesis for a "dual-aspect singularity" is a discussion about how we might be able
to intuitively approach the mind/body paradox. I assert that one of the ways we
might intuitively understand this thesis is the Moebius Principle. The Moebius
Principle is important to my argument because it demonstrates that there are
aspects and dimensions in reality that we have difficulty comprehending through
our normal senses. Once the Moebius Principle is accepted, panpsychism can also
be understood as a realistic and understandable thesis.
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The Moebius Principle is a modern quandary found in the branch of
qualitative mathematics known as topology. Steven Rosen, in his book Science,
Paradox, and the Moebius Principle, illustrates the paradox extremely well (1994,
pp.7-9). If you take a sheet of normal office paper and cut a one-inch strip off one
side and then simply join the ends of the cut strip together with a piece of tape,
you will have a cylindrical ring with an inside surface and an outside surface. If
you now draw a line in the centre all the way around on the inside, and another
line all the way around on the outside, again in the centre, you will now have a
good representation of dualism. The outside line we might designate as
representing matter and the inside line as representing mind. If you press together
your finger and thumb with the paper between and your fingers on the line
anywhere on the ring, you have in some sense taken a slice of reality indicating a
duality. You have matter and mind separate by virtue of the two surfaces of our
cylinder and yet immediately and correspondingly together captured between your
thumb and forefinger. Now, if you undo the tape holding the paper in a cylinder
shape and turn one end over and then re-attach the tape you will now have a twist
in the paper slip. This is called the Moebius strip and it is fundamentally different
from the cylinder strip. Certainly we can still place the thumb and the forefinger,
as before, anywhere along the centre of the strip and they will appear to have
again captured our duality of mind and matter. But this time there are no two
surfaces, inside and outside. To prove this, take a pen and redraw the line and you
will discover only one line and therefore only one surface! This time there is no
duality as such, only two aspects of the same thing as you place your thumb and
finger together anywhere on the strip, because both the surfaces you touch are in
fact the same surface. This is an excellent analogy for the nature of the "dual
aspect singularity." As Rosen asserts, "the two sides of the Moebius are but one
side ... and we begin to see in the Moe bi us surface a visual/geometric
representation of the union of opposites" (Rosen, 1994, p.9).
Problems with Rationality
Ever since the Enlightenment and the elevation of Reason (with a capital R),
any rationality associated with beliefs in religion, not to mention paganism, or
mysticism, has been denied by some. And as a result, an extraordinary and
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unwarranted demand has been placed on such beliefs; that the levels of evidence
required claiming rationality far out strip that required of other philosophical
positions. Even though I have argued that knowledge derived from "personal
panpsychic experiences" passes the test for rationality, the question remains, is
rationality necessary and sufficient for this knowledge? If rationality is neither
necessary nor sufficient for truth, and this particular knowledge encapsulates a
truth, then it can be argued that rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for
this particular knowledge. The problem requires a more intuitive approach. The
Moebius Principle demonstrates this point well. Our normal rational mind has
difficulty working out the dimensional spaces in the workings of the Principle, but
the truth of it can not be denied. And yet, the experience of placing our fingers
either side of the strip or following the centre line to discover it is one line and not
two, is an experience of this truth that is known intuitively.
If we applied classical foundationalism' s demands to our own beliefs of the
past or inductive beliefs about the future we would soon come to the inevitable
conclusion that they can not be rationally justified. Again, moral beliefs, as Clark
points out (2004, p.6), are not well justified on the basis of argument or evidence
in

the classical

foundationalist

sense.

Another criticism

of

classical

foundationalism comes from Alvin Plantinga, claiming that the criteria demanded
by classic foundationalism are self-referentially inconsistent, in that classic
foundationalism is in itself neither self-evident or evident to the senses, nor is it
incorrigible (Clark, 2004, p.6). Clark describes incorrigible beliefs as "first person
states (seeming or appearance beliefs) about which I cannot be wrong."
The main problem with the evidentiary demand to demonstrate rationality is
that rationality is no harbinger for the truth. Rationality merely reflects the status
quo of any particular population at any one time. Firstly I would make the point,
as Clark does in his essay on Religious Epistemology, that "rationality is more a
matter of how one believes than what one believes" (Clark, 2004, p.l). In other
words and as we have already stated, rationality does not equate to truth. It is quite
possible to hold that something is true but to have come by that belief irrationally.
For example I might believe the world is round because every night I flap my
arms and fly around it. Conversely, at one time it was rational for people to
believe that the earth was flat. And finally as this suggests and as Clark points out,
"rationality is person and situation specific" (Clark, 2004, p.1 ). In other words,
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what might be rational for someone at one time and one place, given certain sociohistorical circumstances, may be quite irrational for another in a different time and
place; or, for that matter, what is rational for a person in the same time and place
may be quite irrational for another, due to different experiences.

•

Let me repeat; in order to solve intuitively based knowledge problems we
need to include intuitively based knowledge, or at least allow this form of
knowledge to be considered. If reasoned thinking and rational arguments are the
very constructs that prevent us from understanding our reality in this regard, if
they are the very things that create this perceived duality, then we need to put
thinking aside and attempt to intuitively grasp the true nature of our reality.

Mind-maller Mind-brain
It might be argued that even though the panpsychic thesis addresses the

mind-matter or mind-world problem, how does it resolve the mind-brain
di~tinction?

First, you would have to assert that the two issues, mind-matter and

mind-brain are somehow unrelated. I reject this on the grounds that the brain is
matter. Certainly it is a complex organisation of matter, but there doesn't appear
to be any reason to leave it outside the scope of the thesis or separate one kind of
matter from another. If we accept that mind and matter are merely dual aspects of
'
a singularity, and that any distinction between mind and matter is merely illusory,
then we also have to accept that any distinction between mind and brain is also
illusory. I do not see any problem with this view. The thesis takes into account all
matter, including brain matter. If however, you assert that it is a brute biological
fact that consciousness is a product of brain, as John Searle does (Searle, 1997,_
p.l58), then you may consider there is a problem with accepting my thesis that
mind and matter are in fact indistinct. But, I agree, as Searle asserts, that the brain
causes consciousness, and is in fact responsible for all states of human
consciousness. I agree because, I am not making a ciaim that consciousness and
matter are indistinct. 1 am asserting that mind and matter are indistinct. I am using
"mind" in a broader sense as defined it) the section Terms Defined. This allows for
the normal workings of consciousness to go about its mental workings but
suggests that there is more to mind than mere consciousness. And, it is this
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expanded mind that is one with matter, which we experience when we have a
"personal panpsychic experience."

Paradox, Anomalies and the Dual-aspect Singularity
According to the Oxford Dictionary a paradox is a statement that, whether
true or false, seems or is absurd. Any statement that is in conflict with a
preconceived idea or notion yet is in itselftrue, tends to be paradoxical. Anyone in
Europe who watched the tall masts of a boat disappear down gently over the
horizon, when it was widely believed that the world was flat, would have been
confronted with a paradox. On the one hand the earth was flat, and on the other
hand the boat's masts would indicate that the vessel was 'sinking' over the
horizon and yet returning at a later date. The accepted notion and as such the
rational notion, that the earth is flat is a good analogy with the current generally
accepted notion that the mind and body are separate. But the paradox becomes
apparent when from a realistic point of view it becomes obvious that some crucial
obsetvations simply do not fit into the framework provided by the so-called
known facts. This, in both cases, gives rise to all kinds of partial stories in an
attempt to fill the gaps in logic, whilst trying to remain faithful to the original
concept. Ultimately the paradox remains until such time as a new understanding is
brought to bear on the problem and all anomalies are resolved. The anomaly of the
disappearing mast is resolved when it is understood that the earth is round and not
flat. The anomaly of dualism and how it arises is resolved when it is understood
that there were never two things happening here, only one.
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2.2 Examples of Personal Pan psychic Experiences

All phenomena are mind, mind is all. Mind contains
rivers, mountains, moon, and sun.
Japanese Zen master Dogen

My thesis for a "dual-aspect singularity" perspective is based on an
argument validating non-conceptualised experience, the "personal panpsychic
experience." It is based on a real experience that can either come about by virtue

of an event, and possibly but not necessarily, a crisis event, or from a concerted
effort of a supervised or not-supervised practice that results in an experience of a

'non-dual' unity or wholeness. The world is not made up from a chaotic and
'
random mix of objectivised and individualised separated bodies, of varying
complexities, some of which appear to interact, but, it is a world that is in fact
"whole" and "one" and only fragmented and dualistic in appearance. I draw your
attention to those who have had similar experiences to that which is in the preface
and as a result of those revelations see the unity or oneness of the world. I do not
wish to draw on the "religious experience" per se, as any individual
conceptualised interpretation, religious or otherwise, is immaterial to the point
being made here. Any experience of this nature, whether it is as a result of effort
or crises may be interpreted in many different ways, but, and this is my assertion,
the original experience is real, non-conceptual and ontologically valid, and, the
nature of these experiences is one of non-duality, of unity or oneness.
I wish to again make it quite clear at this point that I am not making any
argument for the existence of God, or that the "singularity" is God, even though
many in the past have identified God with the experience of unity or oneness. If
you were to ask what is the "'singularity" I would suggest it was absolutely
everything, the dual aspects of which manifest as mind and matter. Many
throughout history have had these experiences of oneness, completeness, and
wholeness, and have attempted to interpret and describe the experience in many
different ways. Whole new religions have blossomed from them, all with different
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interpretations. And, in some cases, Buddhism for example, there are many
different interpretations and schools of thought within the one religion. Having
said that, it is to religion that I am obliged to tum for corroborating evidence of
the "personal panpsychic experience," and where we find a rich background of
discussion surrounding the dualistic nature of ordinary human perception.
As stated, Buddhism has many different branches, but all branches are from
the single tree and the roots of that tree are firmly embedded in the experience of
the Buddha's enlightenment. It is a state in which one is no longer entangled in
duality. In Nagarjuna's Treatise of Great Understanding (Mahaprajnaparamita
Sutra) it is explained like this:
All phenomena can be understood to be in two categories: mind and matter. On the
conceptual level, we distinguish mind and matter, but on the level of awakening, all is
mind. Object and mind are both marvellous. Mind is matter, matter is mind. Matter
does not exist outside of matter. Mind does not exist outside of matter. Each is in the
other. This is called the non-duality of mind and matter (Hanh, 1974, p.89)

There is a clear statement resolving the duality on mind and matter in an
ancient Buddhist text. Hanh goes on to explain that when we discriminate between
subject and object, we are removed from Zen and its guiding principle of nonduality. The doctrine of Vijnanavada, one of the Mahayana Buddhist schools, says
that "the word 'knowledge' (vijnana) indicates at the same time the subject and
the object of knowledge. The subject and object of knowledge cannot exist
independently of each other" (Hanh, 1974, p.90). In order to explain the nonconceptual experience of non-duality, Hanh uses the analogy of simply drinking
tea. When we have some tea, we have a direct experience of the tea. The
experience of drinking tea is not a concept. Only afterwards can we reflect on it
and distinguish between this and other experiences. "At the moment of the
experience, you and the taste of the tea are one. There is no differentiation. The
tea is you, and you are the tea. There is not the drinker of the tea and the tea being
enjoyed, because there is no distinction between subject and object in the real
experience" (Hanh, 1974, p.88). At the core of Buddhism is the practice of
meditation and the purpose of that meditation is to stop thinking, to cease the
constant prattle that persists within us, constantly reinforcing itself and
conceptua\ising the way we perceive our world. The Buddhist master Huang Po,
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in speaking of the reality of true nature (what he called "the mind of unity and
thusness"), said:
Buddhas and living beings participate in the same pure and unique mind. There is no
separation concerning this mind. Since time immemorial this mind has never been
created or destroyed; it is neither green nor yellow; it has neither fonn nor aspect; it is
neither being nor non-being; it is neither old nor new, neither short nor long, neither
big nor small. It transcends all intellectual categories, all words and expressions, all
signs and marks, all comparisons and discriminations. It is what it is; if one tries to
conceive it, one loses it. Unlimited like space, it has no boundaries and cannot be
measured. This mind is unity and thusness.lt is Buddha (Hanh, 1974, p.80).

It is not my purpose here to suggest that the above is "dual-aspect
singularitivism" as such but, rather to provide examples of a parallel experience of
reality that certainly endorses the monistic aspect of my thesis. D S Clarke, in his
latest book Panpsychism: Past and Present Selected Readings, also draws our
attention to Buddhism, and in particular to Tiantai Buddhism,27 and points out that
the teachings of the Gotama Buddha, expressed in the early Buddhist sutras, can
be regarded as an early expression of an unrestricted panpsychism (Clarke, 2004
p35). Sogyal Rinpoche, a Buddhist meditation master, in his book The Tibetan

Book of the Living and Dying describes the two fundamental aspects of mind. The
first is the ordinary mind sem: "'That which possesses discriminating awareness,
that which possesses a sense of duality - which grasps or rejects something
external - that is mind. Fundamentally it is that which can associate with an
"other' -with any 'something', that is perceived as different from the perceiver
(Rinpoche, 1992, p.46)." So "sem" is the mind that thinks, plots, desires,
manipulates, that flares up in anger, that creates and indulges. It is the mind that
goes on and on asserting, validating, and confirming its 'existence' by
fragmenting, conceptualising, and solidifying experience. Then, according to
Rinpoche (1992, p.47), "'there is the very nature of mind, its innermost essence,
which is absolutely and always untouched by change ... " and later " ... under
27

Tiantai Buddhism is a school within Mahayana Buddhism that flourished in China from the
seventh to the tenth century, and was transmiued to Japan as Tendai Buddhism. In Jacqueline
Stone's Original Enlightenment and the Transfonnation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Stone
says that this variety of Buddhism claims that "all beings are enlightened inherently, Not only
human beings, but ants and crickets, mountains and rivers, grasses and trees are all innately
Buddha." (cited in Clarke, 2004, p.36)
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certain special circumstances, some inspiration may uncover for us glimpses of
this nature of mind". He goes on to say that it can never be said too often that to
realise the nature of mind is to realise the nature of all things.
These experiences are not confined to any one particular theosophy or
theology. Christian mysticism also has many stories that confinn this type of
knowledge. As a direct result of a "severe crisis" he had at the seminary at Barby,
Friedrich Schleiennacher's essays on religion reflect this idea. In his publication

On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, Schleiennacher bewails the loss
of the 'religious experience' in favour of a more orthodox and rational religion.
Schleiennacher talks about "these systems of theology, these theories of the origin
and the end of the world, these analysis of the notion of an incomprehensible
Being, wherein everything runs to cold arguf)ring, and the highest can be treated
in the tone of a corhmon controversy" (Schleiennacher, 1958, p.l5). We are
getting here the strongest assertion from Schleiermacher that religion is something
to be experienced rather than learnt, that you will "find little in sacred books," that
it is more to do with "feeling" or "intuition" (Schleiermacher, 1958, p.16)
Another example of these life·changing experiences can be found in the life
of Jacob Boehme, a 161h century Christian mystic in whose argument for the
existence of God we can see his panpsychism flourish, as he establishes the
premise of non-emergence of mind in the universe. For he writes (Waterfield,
2001, p.123); "Therefore now if the etemal.mind were not, out of which the
eternal will Gaeth forth, then there would be.no God. But now therefore there is

an etemal mind, which generateth the eternal heart of God, and the Heart
generateth the light, and the light the virtue, and virtue the spirit, and this is the
Almighty God." But, the eternal mind is in the darkness and it conceiveth its will
to the light. Therefore: God, the universe and everything, emerges from mind
(which is nothing). Any argument about Boehme's panpsychism would revolve
not around the issue of emergence of mind from the universe, but of the universe
emergin-g from mind
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2.3 Conclusion
When I first started researching the panpsychism debate I was struck by the
notion that the debate about mind/body was in some sense stuck and could not

progress any further without a "radical solution" being found, as suggested by
Galen Strawson (Griffin, 1998, p.S). As I detailed in the section The Significance

ofthe Panpsychism Debate, several philosophers in the panpsychism debate share
this view. Consequently, I set out to develop a radical solution to the mind~matter
mindwbody problem. That radical solution is the "dualwaspect singularity"

perspective.
The premise for the "dual-aspect singularity" perspective lies in what I have
termed the "personal panpsychic experience". Within these ''personal panpsychic
experiences" the distinction between mind and the world of matter vcinishes, and
the individual is left with the deep~seated ontological kn,owledge that the nature of
our universe is single and not dual. I have argued that this knowledge is
epistemologically valid as it satisfies the criteria fur evidential rationality. -Even
so, I acknowledge that individuals who have not had a "personal panpsychic
experience'' wili have difficulty in reaching the same conclusion through a
rational process. However, I have explained, using the e'iample of the Moebius
Principle as a visual/geometric representation of the union of opposites (Rosen,
1994, p.9), how we can approach this intuitively based (for those without direct
panpsychic experience) knowledge problem. I have given examples of_these types
of experiences and even demonstrated that there is nothing new about them.
I have arrived at the

"dual~aspect

singularity" solution to the

rnind~body

mind-matter paradox by way of the following argument: 1). After having had a
"personal panpsychic experience," an experience that I have argued as being
epistemologically valid, one realises that the dualities we experience in our
everyday thinking lives are illusory. This is because it is the cognitive part of our
brain~consciousness

that separates, divides, and isolates. It can do this by creating

dualistic relationships between itself, the created "I," ' and the rest of the world.
However, what appears to be dualistic is merely dual in aspect only. This

dual~
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aspectivism becomes apparent when one has a "personal panpsychic experience"
where the "I" falls away, as described in my thesis. 2). If dualistic relationships in
the universe are ontologically not real, then we left with no choice but to conclude
that the true nature of the universe has to be singular. Again this knowledge of a
whole, or unified universe becomes apparent through having a "personal
panpsychic experience." 3). If we now reduce the universe down to its essential
elements/aspects of matter on the one hand and mind on the other, we can now
say that (a). Everything that exists has both a mental and a material aspect. (b).
But, neither the mental nor the material are ontologically real

acco~ding

to I), that

"personal panpsychic experiences" acknowledge this and are epistemologically
valid. Therefore (c) both mind and matter exist as aspects of a sinb'tdar universe.
That is that the universe is in essence a "dual-aspect singularity" the nature of
which becomes irrelevant because absolutely everything is contained within the
"singularity" but manifests through its "dual-aspectivism."
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Epilogue
No doubt some of you are wondering what exactly happened on that lonely
beach on the East Coast of Fraser Island. Whenever I've told the story and finish
at the same point as in the preface, it prompts the question: So what happened to
you? To which I love to say "I died of course!" But, what really happened was
this:
After a while my attention returned to the beach and I was wondering
how long seven seconds was and whether or not the time had passed
Just a short way up the beach an angler was standing in waders in the
small surf I moved towards him, I must at this time have looked
rather like I was in some sort �f shock, because he asked me what was
wrong? "I've been bitten, " I said "How long have I been standing
there?" I asked "You've been standing there for over half an hour. " I
was shocked "For half an hour?" "Yep, at least. " He assured me. "I
thought I was bitten by a sea snake, " I said, showing him the tiny bite
marks. "That'll be an eel mate. Lots of eels around here, that's why
I'm wearing waders, those buggers can hurt. " I moved away out of
the surf and fell exhausted on the beach.
Since that day I have re-discovered the expenence I had on the beach
without the trauma of a near-death experience. And life has never been quite the
same ever smce.
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APPENDIX
A general summary of the various philosopl!ical, theological and psychological positions.
~

Philosophical Position
Materialism

Mechanism

Physicalism/Process
Philosophy

Traditional Theism

Panentheism

Dualism

Non-dual Duality

Realism

Idealism

Theological Position
Atheism

Pantheism

Psychological Position
Dualistic Epiphenominal
Psychism

Dual-aspect Singularity Monism
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